








Evaluating the Case for Social Security Reform:
Elderly Poverty, Paternalism and Private Pensions
Maria O'Brien Hylton
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Maria O'Brien Hylton, Evaluating the Case for Social Security Reform: Elderly Poverty, Paternalism and Private Pensions, 64 Brook. L. Rev.
749 (1998).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol64/iss3/2
EVALUATING THE CASE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY




Abstract: This Article considers the many arguments currently
being made in favor of Social Security pension reform and evaluates
each of them in terms of the principal Congressional goal of the
program-the elimination of elderly poverty-as well as more recent
goals that have been articulated by subsequent commentators such
as a reduction in government paternalism and the maximization of
retirement income. The Article begins with a short history of the
public pension program in the United States and considers at length
the details of the various reform proposals that currently enjoy
support. In addition it examines the enormously regressive tax
structure that the current payroll tax imposes and suggests that this
feature, more than any other, of the existing program warrants
modification although not necessarily privatization. Finally, the
Article suggests several ways in which to order the competing claims
of reformers who favor privatization and those who prefer tinkering
with the status quo and concludes that this debate can best be
understood in light of the clash between equity and efficiency that
scholars and practitioners perennially confront in the insurance
arena.
INTRODUCTION
In his landmark study, The Struggle for Social Security
1900-1935, Roy Lubove argued that various forms of social
insurance "aspired to rationalize the income-maintenance sys-
tem in the United States. Such rationalization hinged upon...
the transfer of responsibilities from the voluntary to the public
sector. The need for social insurance was rooted in the
* © 1998 Maria O'Brien Hylton. All Rights Reserved.
Professor, Boston University School of Law. A.B., Harvard University; J.D.,
Yale Law School. This Article was originally presented at the symposium "Getting
Ready for Individually Managed Pensions: A Global Perspective" held at Brooklyn
Law School, September 17, 1998.
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individual's precarious status in a wage-centered, money econo-
my. "1 Today, no one seriously argues that the problem of po-
tential economic dependency in old age has been eliminated.
On the contrary, supporters of a reformed Social Security pen-
sion program explicitly rely on the current program's question-
able financial viability as the basis for future reforms. This
modern acceptance of the basic virtue of the public pension
program represents a radical departure from the vociferous
hostility which nearly engulfed the original program.2
Our focus today, then, is not on the desirability of this
compulsory social insurance scheme but on what can and
should be done to ensure its financial viability well into the
next century. Or so it appears. In truth, some of the proposals
currently touted in the name of "saving" Social Security would,
in some cases, so radically alter the foundations of the program
as to justify a conclusion that the whole concept of social insur-
ance for elderly wage earners is, as it was in the 1930s, again
under attack.
The current debate over privatization is, at least in part, a
debate about whether and how to socialize risk (in this case
risk of inadequate income upon retirement). This means that a
conversation about Social Security reform is, at bottom, in-
formed by the same principle at stake in the controversy over
insurance risk classification. The issue is the extent to which
so-called "discriminatory" outcomes should be tolerated and
can be justified by an appeal to efficiency maximization. For
example, would higher pension income returns delivered by a
healthy stock market outweigh the loss to low income retirees
of the income transfer feature that characterizes the existing
program? Would individual retirement accounts (presumably
associated with some degree of investment autonomy) result in
such an enhancement of overall retiree wealth, thereby dimin-
ishing the loss (to some) of the transfer payment? Supporters
of individual, private accounts say "yes." Others are less sure.
ROY LUBOVE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY, 1900-1935 23 (1968).
2 Although hard to appreciate today, several historians have chronicled Social
Security's shaky start. See, e.g., An Analysis of The Development and Rationales of
the U.S. Income Security System, 1776-1980 Before the Select Committee on Aging,
97th Cong. (Comm. Pub. No. 97-303 1981) (statement of Michael S. March) [here-
inafter An Analysis of Development]; GERALD D. NASH ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY:
THE FIRST HALF CENTURY (1988).
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This Article provides a short historical introduction and then
proceeds to evaluate the proposals for individually managed
pensions in terms of the program's original goals: reduction in
elderly poverty, income transfers from high income workers to
those with relatively low incomes, and provision of a minimal
income upon retirement so as to avoid elderly dependency and
destitution.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF PUBLIC PENSION IN THE U.S.
Several comprehensive histories of the Social Security
program3 have been written which provide the details of both
the political and economic climate during the Great Depression
which culminated in the most voluminous and far reaching
social legislation this country had seen. Below this Author
briefly recounts the details in order to explore some of the
value judgments contained in the final legislation.
Some 60 years ago the American economy was convulsed
by massive unemployment;4 the stock market had lost approxi-
mately 70 percent of its value from 1928 to 1933, and real
GNP had contracted by more than one quarter from 1929 to
1934.' On January 8, 1934 President Franklin Delano Roose-
velt announced his intention to provide for Social Security. He
created by executive order a committee on economic security
which was empowered to study the problem of economic inse-
curity and to make recommendations which would ultimately
serve as the basis for legislation. The committee's recommen-
dations were presented to Congress in January of 1935; the
' See, e.g., ARTHUR J. ALTMEYER, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY
(1968); LUBOVE, supra note 1; EDWIN E. WITrE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ACT (1962); see also Edward Berkowitz & Kim McQuaid, Businessman
and Bureaucrat: The Evolution of the American Social Welfare System, 1900-1940,
38 J. ECON. HIST. 120 (1978).
See An Analysis of Development, supra note 2, at 24 (in 1933 unemployment
was estimated at over 13 million people out of a labor force of 50 million); see
also CAROLYN L. WEAVER, THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL SECURITY: ECONOMIC AND POLITI-
CAL ORIGINS 58-76 (1982).
' See Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71
TEMP. L. REV. 131, 133 (1998). See generally An Analysis of Development, supra
note 2, at 20-21; NASH ET AL., supra note 2, at 8.
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Social Security Act of 1935 was signed into law on August 14,
1935 and immediately triggered litigation aimed at establish-
ing the Act's unconstitutionality.6
The new Act created a social insurance program designed
to pay retired workers age 65 or older an income. At the sign-
ing of the Act, the President remarked:
[we can never insure one hundred percent of the population against one
hundred percent of the hazards and vicissitudes of life, but we have tried to
frame a law which will give some measure of protection to the average citi-
zen and to his family against the loss of a job and against poverty-ridden old
age .... 7
Although the Act would be amended in a variety of ways
in subsequent years, the basic structure of the program has
remained unchanged. (The Medicare bill was signed on July
30, 1965 by President Lyndon Baines Johnson;' the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act was added in 1969;9 the
Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") was created
in 1977;1o the Department of Health and Human Services
6 See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937). In both opinions, Justice Cardozo rejects the claim that the
federal government cannot impose income and excise taxes to raise revenue for the
program to spend in aid of the "general welfare." In Helvering, the Court states:
"Congress may spend money in aid of the general welfare . .. ITIhe concept of
the 'general welfare' [is not] static. Needs that were narrow or parochial a century
ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the Nation. What is
critical or urgent changes with the times." 301 U.S. at 640-41 (internal citations
omitted); while in Steward the Court notes:
[tihe Social Security Act is an attempt to find a method by which all
these public agencies may work together to a common end. Every dollar
of the new taxes will continue in all likelihood to be used and needed by
the nation as long as states are unwilling, whether through timidity or
for other motives, to do what can be done at home. At least the infer-
ence is permissible that Congress so believed, though retaining undimin-
ished freedom to spend the money as it pleased.
301 U.S. at 588-89.
7 SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOCIAL SECURITY: SOCIAL SECURI-
TY 60TH ANNIVERSARY 4 (SSA Pub. No. 21-059, 1995) [hereinafter A BRIEF HISTO-
RY]. This objective was repeated in the President's message to Congress. 74 CONG.
REC. 598 (Jan. 17, 1935) (message of President Roosevelt).
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320, 1395 (1998).
30 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1998) The Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 30
U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1998), broadened the coverage of the Social Security pro-
gram and transferred its oversight to the Department of Labor.
"0 The HCFA was created as a principal operating component of the HHS by
the Secretary on March 8, 1977 to combine the oversight of the Medicare program,
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("HHS") was created in a cabinet level reorganization in
1980;11 and in 1983, President Ronald Reagan signed into law
additional changes which extended coverage to federal employ-
ees, increased the retirement age, and subjected Social Securi-
ty benefits to taxation.) 2 Today, more than one in seven
Americans receives a Social Security benefit, and more than 90
percent of working people are subject to the tax which funds
the program. 3
Although it may appear today that this kind of massive
social insurance program was inevitable, Arthur Altmeyer, who
served on the first Social Security Board, noted that "[ilt really
didn't seem to us inevitable at the time... quite the con-
trary."14 The program reflected, of course, several key value
judgments, some of which are under attack today. The first
important value reflected in the legislation is the symbolic im-
portance of a uniform tax rate, shared equally by employers
and employees. The serious regressiveness problem posed by
such a rate and exacerbated by the "cap" or maximum annual
taxable amount has caused much concern among commenta-
tors.
The second significant value reflected in the Act is the
decision to create a "pay-as-you-go" system devoid of any sig-
nificant opportunity for the investment of contributions. Much
has been said about this system and the absence of an invest-
ment feature driving a substantial number of today's proposals
for partial privatization.
The third value, and a key component of this social legisla-
tion, is the benefit formula's built-in transfer of benefits to low
wage earners from high wage earners. Comprehensive discus-
the federal portion of Medicaid, and related quality assurance activities under one
administration. For the HCFA's statement of organization, see 59 Fed. Reg. 14,628
(1994).
" Originally created as the Department of Health, Education and Welfare on
April 11, 1953, the HHS was redesignated by the Department of Education Orga-
nization Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (1998).
2 These amendments were enacted after the President had appointed a blue-
ribbon panel, known as the Greenspan Commission, to study the long term financ-
ing crisis of Social Security and to make recommendations for legislative changes.
See A BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 7, at 16.
13 See A BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 7, at 19.
" Arthur J. Altmeyer, If, Address at the Michigan Social Security Conference
(Nov. 16, 1960) <http://www.ssa.gov/history/ajall60.html>.
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sions as to the importance of this feature are lacking. It is dis-
cussed, therefore, in detail below.
Finally, the statute is explicitly concerned with the allevia-
tion of elderly poverty. Despite the fact that it has been fash-
ionable of late to proclaim the many ways in which the public
sector falls short when compared with the efforts of the pri-
vate, Social Security has been phenomenally successful in
terms of this goal. It has reduced elderly poverty from 50 per-
cent in 1935 to 11 percent today. 5 In fact, because of Social
Security, one is far more likely to be poor if one is a child or a
single mother than elderly. 6 This means that on its own
terms the program has been successful. Such success, of course,
does not defeat any claim for program modification, but it does
mean that reform proposals should be subject to considerable
scrutiny as they might unsettle decades of achievement.
II. THE SPECTRUM OF REFORM PROPOSALS
In order to understand the many reform proposals on the
table, it is critical to appreciate how the current program is fi-
nanced and how it calculates benefit payments to eligible retir-
ees. As is widely known, participation in the program is, for
covered employees, mandatory. For some commentators, this
feature, alone, is objectionable. Indeed, Professor Feldstein
claims to have demonstrated that participation in Social Secu-
rity has diverted resources from other more valuable avenues
of savings and investment. " Others object strenuously on the
grounds of state paternalism. 8 The compulsory nature of the
15 Without Social Security benefits, today's elderly poverty rate would jump to
42%. Moreover, Social Security currently provides 90% or more of all income re-
ceived by 30% of elderly beneficiaries. See Richelle Friedman, Social Security: More
Secure Than Privatizers Want You To Believe, NETWORK CONNECTION, Sept.-Oct.
1998, at 3.
" See generally Friedman, supra note 15, at 3-5.
'7 See, e.g., MARTIN FELDSTEIN, THE SOCIAL SECURITY EXPLOSION 103-04 (Pub.
Inst. No. 81, 1985); Martin Feldstein, How to Save Social Security, N.Y. TIMES,
July 27, 1998, at A17.
" See, e.g., GERALD DWORKIN, PATERNALISM (1983) (paternalism is "the interfer-
ence with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to
the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the persons being co-
erced."); JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 5 (1983) ("[individual freedom is abrogated
in the name of benevolence ... ."; id. at 7 ("paternalism . . . [is] freedom-dimin-
ishing . . . ."); Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evi-
[Vol. 64: 3
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scheme, however, is what allows the benefit formula to shift
benefits toward low wage workers and away from high wage
workers." It also prevents high wage earners from electing to
place their contributions in other investment vehicles where
this income redistribution feature is not present. Thus, the
mandatory feature of the program is essentially a mechanism
for avoiding the phenomenon of adverse selection so common
in other kinds of public and private insurance."
When the Act was first enacted, it provided for the cre-
ation of a reserve to be used to fund future benefits; this was
subject to much criticism2' and ultimately, in 1939 Congress
eliminated the reserve.22 Thus, from 1939 until the late 1970s
the system functioned on a pay-as-you-go basis as opposed to a
funded system. This is an important distinction. It is impor-
tant to appreciate that privatization is not the same thing as a
"pre-" or "fully-" funded arrangement. A funded system is one
in which retirement funds are built up in advance, during the
working years of an employee who then draws down on these
funds (and the attendant interest) during retirement. Fully
funding retirement makes sense for a number of reasons. First,
it increases the savings rate, freeing up the stock of capital
available for productive investment. It has the further advan-
tage of avoiding the burdensome tax rates that are needed to
fund a "pay-as-you-go" arrangement. Professors Kotlikoff and
Leibfritz recently estimated that future generations of Ameri-
cans will face a Social Security tax burden 50 percent greater
than that of individuals born today.23 Not only would this
dence and Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1275 (1991).
1" See Michael J. Boskin et al., Social Security: A Financial Appraisal Across
and Within Generations, 40 NATL TAX J. 19 (1987). See generally U.S. GEN. AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR ADDRESSING PRO-
GRAM SOLVENCY 27-28 (GAO/HEHS-98-33, July 1998) [hereinafter GAO, SOCIAL
SECURITY].
20 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION-CASES AND
MATERIALS 3-4, 130-43 (1995). Adverse selection problems arise in the insurance
context because potential policyholders know better than insurers whether they
pose comparatively high or low risk: when insurers charge each party the same
price for coverage, then high-risk parties elect to be insured in greater proportion
than low-risk parties, and insurers are forced to raise the price of coverage.
21 See Moore, supra note 5, at 139.
2 See Moore, supra note 5, at 139.
2See LAURENCE KOTLIKOFF & WILLi LEIBFRITz, AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARI-
SON OF GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTS (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working
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kind of tax rate represent an enormous hardship for many
moderate income workers, it would almost surely prove politi-
cally intolerable.
Privatization-total or partial-would permit workers to
place contributions into private accounts. While this would, at
first, exacerbate the funding problem because it would divert
tax dollars into accounts from which they could not be used to
satisfy the government's existing obligations to current retir-
ees, the privatization proposals might subsequently generate
more income for certain retirees than Social Security. In 1950
there were sixteen workers for every eligible retiree; by 2030
there will likely be less than two.'
We are confronted today with the various privatization
proposals for several reasons, including the misconception that
privatization will solve the funding problem. It will not. In
the short run, any diversion of taxes into private accounts will
exacerbate the funding problem, leaving the government with
only the following few alternatives: cut benefits; raise taxes;
raise the eligibility threshold at which a participant may begin
collecting; or some combination of each of these. The problem
of unfunded liabilities really should be considered separate
from the question of privatization. Privatization is attractive
for a number of reasons, but it should not be understood as a
solution to the funding issue. Currently, of course, the system
consists of both a "pay-as-you-go" feature and partial tempo-
rary reserve financing (often referred to as "the Fund")Y To
the extent that proponents of privatization rely on concerns
about unfunded liabilities to promote their schemes, they are
confusing the debate. The case for privatization must be made
separately from the case for funding reform, although a com-
Paper No. 6447, 1998). Payroll taxes have already begun increasing, as noted in a
recent Wall Street Journal article. Tax Report: A Special Summary and Forecast of
Federal and State Tax Developments, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1998, at Al.
24 See DANIEL J. MITCHELL, A BRIEF GUIDE TO SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 3
(Heritage Found. Talking Points No. 22, Aug. 1997). See generally LAURENCE J.
KOTLIKOFF ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY: PRIVATIZATION AND PROGESSIVITY (National
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6428, 1998).
25 Currently about $500 billion is available in the Fund to pay future benefits.
I 1994-1996 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY REPORT.: FINDINGS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS 16 (1997) [hereinafter I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT].
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prehensive proposal would, ideally, include a mechanism for
funding existing liabilities and avoiding future, unfunded
promises.
III. EVALUATING THE CASE FOR REFORM
There are many different "camps" promoting numerous
privatization plans." For the purposes of general discussion,
one can identify four basic proposals: first, the immediate,
complete privatization of all contributions for all participants;
second, the partial privatization of some of the contributions of
all participants; third, changes to the existing program that
would permit the maintenance of basic benefits for at least
some participants; and, fourth, complete privatization of contri-
butions for some, but not all, workers. Because complete and
total privatization for any population segment (much less all
covered workers) has not received much serious attention from
policymakers, this Article focuses below on partial privatiza-
tion and on plan amendments that would maintain basic bene-
fits for at least some portion of recipients.
Recently, the GAO released a report which examined the
seriousness of the Social Security funding shortfall and a num-
ber of proposals for strengthening the program, including pri-
vate accounts." The report finds that the issue of investment
risk to retirees is non-trivial. It notes, "[elven if the market
experienced no dramatic or long-lasting downturns, the normal
market cycles will create 'winners' and 'losers', depending upon
when and how workers invest their Social Security assets in
the market and when they liquidate their holdings. Individuals
with similar work histories could receive substantially differ-
ent benefits.""
With respect to adjustments that would leave the current
plan structure intact, the report notes that raising the payroll
tax would have both advantages and disadvantages for work-
ers. Disadvantages include lower disposable income and higher
labor costs. One advantage of raising the payroll tax is that it
28 Id. at 12-13, 25-33; see also GAO, SOCIAL SECURITY supra note 19; Jackie
Calmes, Social Security Report Opens Debate, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1997, at A2.
27 See GAO, SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 19.
28 Id. at 56.
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would not have the effect of raising program costs through
higher benefits, as benefits are calculated on the basis of cov-
ered earnings, not contributions. Of course, it is this that
would reduce the value to workers of the program because
their future benefits would remain the same-they would only
cost more to obtain. The GAO report does not provide a theo-
retical mechanism with which to evaluate these various pro-
posals. This Article suggests below that two very different
views of government coercion and equality inform these pro-
posals. Ultimate resolution can only be made with reference to
a particular set of values.
A. Partial Privatization
The various partial privatization proposals have in com-
mon two characteristics-all workers (sometimes only those
below a certain age) must contribute a percentage of current
taxes to a private, individual account and must direct the in-
vestment of funds in that account to a private source. (Wheth-
er and how much control the government would have in direct-
ing the investment of the funds in these accounts is the object
of considerable controversy.) 9 A worker would then have
available at retirement the following two sources of benefits:
income from the individual account (which would be a function
of contributions and investment performance) and a guaran-
teed minimum benefit. This guaranteed minimum benefit
amount would probably be less than the current Social Securi-
ty benefit amount because of the diversion of taxes to the pri-
vate, individual fund.
The core argument in favor of partial privatization is that
workers will be better off because future worker contributions
will not go toward the ongoing support of an existing retiree,
but rather, will enjoy a substantial investment period, provid-
ing a much larger benefit at retirement. In addition, the fund-
29 See, e.g., I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 25, at 35-102; PETER J.
FERRARA, POWER TO THE PEOPLE: A PRIVATE OPTION FOR SOCIAL SECURITY (Ameri-
cans for Tax Reform Policy Brief, 1996); MICHAEL TANNER, A NEW SOCIAL SECURI-
TY DEBATE (Cato Inst. ed.) (Robert M. Ball approach would allow government to
invest in private capital markets, while Scheiber-Weaver proposal advocates giving
investment control to individuals); Ronald Brownstein, Conservatives Want Risks of
Old Age Assumed By People, Not Government, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1997, at A5.
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ing problem is at least partially addressed in that the govern-
ment makes no commitment and, therefore, incurs no liability
with respect to the private, individual account. Retirees will
have more money to spend during their retirement, and the
likelihood of elderly dependence and poverty will be reduced.
Therefore, private accounts are consistent with the spirit and
goals of the original program.
B. Plan Amendments to Maintain Basic Benefits
On the other side of the divide from partial privatization
proponents are those who are persuaded that the current pro-
gram is basically sound and needs only minor adjustments to
correct the pending funding imbalance. It is true that no one
can say for sure how serious the funding shortfall will be or
exactly when it will occur. The timing and severity of the loom-
ing crisis depends on assumptions about demographic changes,
interest rates, tax rates and growth in worker productivity.
Supporters of relatively minor modifications which would
not include any partial privatization tend to believe in the
political feasibility of tax increases to support unfunded liabili-
ties;"0 they tend to feel that any costs associated with, for ex-
ample, raising the eligible retirement age1are negligible. In
addition, and in contrast to supporters of partial privatization,
adherents of the current plan structure point to Social
Security's undisputed success in reducing elderly poverty and
dependence, and view the income transfer feature from high to
low wage workers as an attractive way to further tax high
earners.32 The only reservation which exists with regard to
"0 See, e.g., Future of Social Security; Personal Accounts Before the Subcom.i.
on Soc. Sec. of the House of Representatives Ways and Means Comm., 105th Cong.
(June 3, 1998) (testimony of Robert M. Ball, former Comm'r of Soc. Sec.); see also
I ADvIsoRY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 25, at 16-21, 25-27.
31 See, e.g., Robert Rosenblatt, GAO Warns Against Raising Age for Retirees,
L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1998, at Al. This is a real hardship for blue collar, manual
laborers, many of whom cannot realistically expect to work for long after age 65
due to the physical demands of their jobs. Moreover, some of them might have to
apply for disability benefits, driving up additional costs for the federal government.
2 For some or all of these arguments, see Henry J. Aaron & Robert D.
Reischauer, A Look at the Future of Social Security, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1998, at
C3; Friedman, supra note 15, at 13-14; Richard Gephardt, Be Careful With Social
Security, WASH. POST, July 1, 1998, at A23.
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increasing the tax rate for contributions is its tremendously
regressive nature.3 Some commentators have suggested that
one way to reduce the regressiveness would be to eliminate the
cap on taxable income.34 While this would help, it clearly does
not eliminate the basic problem of a flat tax rate across all
income levels.
C. Discussion
Although it may at first appear so, supporters of partial
privatization and those who would only "tinker" with the exist-
ing system are not, in fact, talking at cross purposes. On the
contrary, at the heart of this debate are conflicting visions of
the proper role of the state, the degree to which investment
risk can be made politically tolerable (even to those segments
of the population that are not financially sophisticated), and a
fundamental (albeit not new) conflict between equality and
efficiency, Supporters of partial privatization believe, at the
end of the day, that the distasteful, compulsory nature of the
Social Security program is mitigated by giving workers a sig-
nificant say in how and where their contributions are invested.
This desire for a measure of autonomy, in spite of the back-
ground requirement that one must first save for retirement at
all, resonates with those who are hostile to state paternalism.
Paternalism, in this context, is seen as a substantial in-
fringement on liberty-the forced taking of earned dollars and
the subsequent placement of that money in what must surely
be judged a low risk/low return investment. Paternalism here
is implicitly rejected as a misguided effort to protect individu-
als from themselves or from their tendency to make mistakes
and under-invest for retirement.
Social Security is clearly paternalistic. There are other
bases upon which to support the program, however. Income
redistribution-accepted as a legitimate aim with respect to
certain portions of the Internal Revenue Code35-is likewise a
' See GAO, SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 19, at 34. The Advisory Council on
Social Security has concluded that there is little political support for bringing the
program back into financial balance through payroll tax increases alone.
"' Currently, the cap is set at $65,400.00 for 1997. 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(1)
(1998).
" See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 32 (1998) (earned income credit); see also ALICIA H.
[Vol. 64:3
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useful model for Social Security. Of course, at the end of the
day there is no clear way to resolve the competing claims of
those who favor liberty and those who favor the program's
income redistribution component.
A common concern raised by detractors of privatization is
the introduction of market risk to a program that has, until
now, functioned like a straightforward defined benefit plan. 6
The argument, essentially, is that privatization proposals actu-
ally promise nothing-just the possibility of better economic
performance. The notoriously volatile nature of the stock mar-
ket is cited to buttress this position. The critique always ends
with the question: what happens to the retiree whose invest-
ments perform very badly? Supporters of privatization point to
the long term tendency of the market to recover over time and
the enormous upside potential for retirees to earn market rates
of return over long periods of time. It is true, of course, that, as
with a defined contribution"7 plan in the ERISA 8 context,
nothing is promised. This has not kept millions of workers and
employers from moving away from the supposed security 9 of
a defined benefit plan toward defined contribution arrange-
ments precisely in order to capture the investment advantage.
MUNNELL, THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 6-7 (1977) (discussing the social ade-
quacy component of Social Security).
" See Peter T. Scott, A National Retirement Policy, 44 TAX NOTES 913, 919-20
(1989). A defined benefit ("DB") plan guarantees a certain amount to be paid at
an employee's retirement, thereby protecting the participant against investment
risk. If plan assets diminish below appropriate funding levels, it is the plan
sponsor's duty to increase pension contributions. Defined contribution ("DC") plans,
on the other hand, do not provide specific dollar benefits at retirement. Instead,
the benefits payable to participating employees are based on the amount of em-
ployer contributions to the plan. Defined benefit plans, which numbered 103,000 in
1975, now total 53,000 while defined contribution plans have climbed to 647,000
from 208,000 in the same period, according to the Employee Benefits Research
Institute ("EBRI"). ERISA statutes relating to DB plans include 29 U.S.C. § 1344
(1998).
'7 See Scott, supra note 36, at 919-20.
See Scott, supra note 36, at 919-20.
' However, there is an "illusory" nature to defined benefit plans-at the end of
the day, a plan sponsor can terminate or inadequately contribute to the plans,
leaving them grossly underfunded. Moreover, even though the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation ("PBGC") steps in, it generally makes only a partial pay-
ment, on vested benefits.
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Finally, no real resolution of these competing positions is
possible because, like the equity/efficiency debate in the insur-
ance context, each set of arguments poses some difficulty. As
Ken Abraham ° and this Author 4' have described in other
settings, the tension in insurance between equity (here, redis-
tribution of income from high to low wage earners because low
earners are presumed to have had little opportunity to save
during their working lives; also thought in some circumstances
to consist of the "thoughtful scrutiny of individuals") 42 and
efficiency (here, probably income maximization and autonomy
for retirees) recurs in many other employee benefits contexts.
Proponents of privatization certainly cannot guarantee that
any given retiree will do better under a semi-autonomous mar-
ket investment scheme, but they can demonstrate that, on
average, most retirees should do better. The appeal of the
income transfer feature is, without question, limited to those
who favor some form of income redistribution. This appeal is
demonstrably not universal. In the end, maybe the most that
can be said is that the sum weight of the arguments, in light of
the multiple miseries faced by the elderly poor, not only sup-
port a compulsory system of retirement savings, but one that
puts, at most, a relatively small portion of those savings at
risk.
The equity argument likely merits an additional comment.
Many commentators believe that because this is a government,
as opposed to private, program, a certain amount of attention
40 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classifi-
cation, 71 VA. L. REV. 403 (1985).
" See Maria O'Brien Hylton, Insurance Risk Classification After McGann: Man-
aging Risk Efficiently in the Shadow of the ADA, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 59, 94 (1995)
("Supporters of risk management practices, specifically classification, reveal prefer-
ences for efficiency and loss prevention incentives as the operative values in
the . . . market. These values are not universally shared and frequently clash
with competing concerns about avoiding the grouping of individuals based on sex,
race, etc.").
42 See City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 709 (1978) (holding that Title VII does not allow discrimination based on
sexual stereotypes, no matter how sound the underlying actuarial assumptions).
Thus, the Los Angeles Department of Power and Water could not require its fe-
male employees to make larger contributions to its pension fund than its male em-
ployees simply because women, as a class, generally live longer than men. Even if
the sex-distinct mortality tables were efficient for group pricing, it was unfair to
individuals-in this case, to the women who do not live as long as the average
man.
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must be paid to formal equality-i.e., two workers with essen-
tially similar employment/earnings histories ought to draw
substantially the same benefits upon retirement. Under partial
privatization, this kind of "equality of outcome" cannot be
guaranteed. On the contrary, depending upon the nature of
investment decisions made by each worker and the timing of
withdrawals, one can readily imagine two workers with similar
histories who have radically different income streams at retire-
ment under the program. This, for some, offends notions of
basic fairness and equity.43 Part of the efficiency/income max-
imization response, of course, is that this is the natural and
appropriate outcome of semi-autonomous choice, no different
from the varied experiences of consumers who elect to pur-
chase disparate, albeit equally priced, goods and experience
different levels of satisfaction. We clearly tolerate this "in-
equality" in other arenas-why not with public pensions as
well?
CONCLUSION
Two of the three basic proposals currently floating around,
which purport to "solve" the funding crisis looming in the next
century, are not necessarily linked to program solvency or
financing: fully private accounts (with substantial individual
control over investment strategy) and partial, private accounts
(with substantial government control over investment options).
The case for any kind of privatization must, in the end, stand
on its own merits independent of the funding question. A help-
ful place to start the discussion is to ask: "would we want
privatization even if there was no pending issue of unfunded
future liabilities?" If not, the various "maintain benefits" pro-
posals, which Congress has looked to in the past, remain rela-
tively attractive. Still, there exists substantial consensus that
the only politically viable proposals are those involving partial
privatization. It is here that this Article focuses in suggesting
criteria for evaluating reform.
See GAO, SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 19, at 56. Equity arguments have
also been raised with regard to nontaxable fringe benefits, primarily afforded to
well compensated employees, and to two-earner couples vis-a-vis couples with only
one worker. I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 25, at 139-43.
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Specifically, the following criteria should be included as
policymakers determine how to proceed: first, it is important
to recall that the program's original, stated goal was the allevi-
ation of elderly poverty within relevant political
constraints-this ought to remain the benchmark. Benefits
proposals should be subject to the repeated query: what is the
expected effect of this change on rates of elderly poverty? Sec-
ond, how are other vulnerable plan participants and beneficia-
ries affected? Categories of vulnerability may be the subject of
some debate, but women, the poorly educated and low income
workers might be useful places to start. Third, what are the
horizontal and vertical equity effects of plan changes which
eliminate the income transfer feature from the program? Is the
absence of intergenerational transfers problematic? (Recall
that under a partial privatization regime, two workers with
substantially similar work histories could retire with dramati-
cally different benefits.) Fourth, is there evidence which sug-
gests privatization would enhance efficiency by maximizing
income and/or autonomy for retirees? How important a value is
autonomy to a retirement program? Fifth, is the introduction of
investment (or market) risk politically tolerable? If so, what
should be done to address the (apparently) widespread problem
of investor/participant ignorance? Finally, it seems obvious
that on its own terms the program has been a dramatic suc-
cess, as the drop in rates of elderly poverty demonstrates.
Except for concerns about funding, the plan enjoys enormous
political support. Thus, any changes should be made with an
eye toward retaining as much good will for the plan as possi-
ble.
None of these criteria is included in order to suggest that
the current program is without blemish. The extreme
regressivity of the current flat payroll tax, the unpleasant
intrusion of the state into individual decisions about financial
planning which a compulsory program necessarily entails, and
the cap on taxable income which exacerbates vertical equity
problems are but a few examples of serious issues raised by
the plan's current design.
At the end of the day there is no single, simple answer to
the question of whether privatization is a sound idea. The real
issue is: good for whom? Given the extreme miseries of elderly
poverty (a hallmark of which is the nearly complete absence of
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realistic prospects for upward mobility unlike poverty at other
stages in life) the most one might say is that, on balance, a
small amount of market risk may be tolerable.

